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Abstract
The Scottish Government’s proposal to introduce a “Named Person” scheme was 
 intended to improve child protection and wellbeing in Scotland, by allocating an iden-
tified Named Person to every child in Scotland. The scheme was met by considerable 
concern from a range of parties, and was challenged in the courts on the basis that the 
data sharing provisions infringed the data protection and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (echr) privacy rights of children and parents. As a re-
sult of the complexities of introducing lawful data sharing provisions, the scheme has 
now been scrapped, without ever being introduced. However, at no point was there 
any sustained analysis of the impact of Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (uncrc) on the Named Person scheme: to what extent would 
the Scottish Government proposals have helped parents meet their obligations under 
Article 5? Or would they in fact have infringed parents’ and children’s rights? This ar-
ticle provides a case study of Article 5 in practice, by setting out the background to the 
now-defunct Named Person scheme, before going on to analyse its interaction – and 
compliance – with the State Party’s obligations under Article 5.
Keywords
Article 5, uncrc – Named Person scheme – Scotland – child protection – parental 
responsibilities and rights – data protection – Article 8 privacy
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1 Introduction
This article considers the impact of Article 5, uncrc on the proposed Named 
Person scheme in Scotland – legislated for in 2014 and abandoned in 2019, 
without ever having been implemented. The core premise of this scheme was 
that every child in Scotland should be allocated a Named Person: an adult who 
would be a single identified point of contact, who knew the child, and could 
help support and advise the child and parents. Despite laudable aims, the 
scheme was dogged by controversy, including a successful challenge in 2016 in 
the UK Supreme Court (The Christian Institute and Others v. The Lord Advocate 
[2016] uksc 51). Yet in addition to the many criticisms levied against the pro-
posals, a further question can be asked: to what extent would the appointment 
of a Named Person have supported or hindered the ‘responsibilities, rights and 
duties’ of parents under Article 5? Despite the scheme being cancelled, it nev-
ertheless offers a valuable case study on a legislative proposal which was de-
signed to improve support for children and parents, but which did not appar-
ently take into account the provisions of Article 5.
After setting out the core elements of the Named Person scheme, I will brief-
ly outline the controversy and litigation that hampered its introduction, before 
exploring the ramifications of Article 5 in this context.
2 The Scheme and Its Background
2.1 The Scheme
The Named Person scheme was introduced in the Children and Young People 
(Scotland) Act 2014 (hereafter the “2014 Act”), although the relevant part of the 
statute was never brought into force and, in September 2019, the Deputy First 
Minister announced the Scottish Government would not be proceeding with 
the scheme (Scottish Parliament Business, 2019). If it had been implement-
ed, the scheme would have seen a Named Person appointed to every child in 
Scotland. “Child” here was defined as a child or young person up to 18 years old 
(2014 Act, s. 97(1)).1 Typically, the local authority would have been responsible 
for making arrangements for provision of a Named Person (2014 Act, s. 21), un-
less the child was still of pre-school age (2014 Act, s. 20), or was of school age 
1 The only exception, whereby no Named Person was to be appointed, was for children who 
are members of any of the regular forces. Thus, a 16-year old in the Army would not have an 
appointed Named Person: s. 21(1) and (4). Moreover, where a child was in the reserve forces, 
the 2014 Act would not apply when the child was subject to service law: s. 19(6). These were 
both grounds for concern in themselves.
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but attended an independent school, or was in secure accommodation, or in 
legal custody, in which case other specified organisations would have appoint-
ed a Named Person in respect of the child (2014 Act, s. 21). As a general rule, the 
Named Person would typically have been the local Health Visitor for the first 
five years of the child’s life and then, when the child moved to school, a teacher 
or the school headteacher. There was no reference in the 2014 Act to what hap-
pened when a 16- or 17-year old got married: presumably they (and their spouse, 
if also 16 or 17) would still have a Named Person.2
The Named Person was intended to exercise specified statutory functions, 
all in order to ‘promote, secure or safeguard the wellbeing of the child or young 
person’ (2014 Act, s. 19(5)). These functions were:
1. Advising, informing or supporting the child or young person, or a parent 
of the child or young person,
2. Helping the child or young person, or a parent of the child or young per-
son, to access a service or support, or
3. Discussing, or raising, a matter about the child or young person with a 
service provider or relevant authority, and
4. Such other functions as are specified by [the 2014] Act or any other enact-
ment as being functions of a Named Person in relation to a child or young 
person (2014 Act, s. 19(5)(a) and (b)).
In order to fulfil these functions, the service provider (encompassing the 
Named Person) and the local authority were to have a right to share informa-
tion where, in the opinion of the information holder, it would be relevant for 
the exercise of the Named Person functions, ought to be provided, and would 
not otherwise prejudice any criminal investigation or prosecution of crime 
(2014 Act, s. 26(1)-(4)). This information sharing could of course have com-
prised the personal data of the child or young person and parents and, as 
framed in the 2014 Act, the consent of the child, young person or parent would 
not be required – although in providing any information, the information 
holder (not necessarily the Named Person), was directed to ‘ascertain and have 
regard to the views of the child’, with regard to the child’s age and maturity 
(2014 Act, s. 26(5) and (6)).
One of the critical factors was that the scheme was designed to apply to 
 every child, whether previously identified as “at risk” or not. While the 2014 Act 
did not seek to impose an obligation on children or parents to use their allo-
cated Named Person, there was also no facility to opt out of the scheme. This 
2 Of course, the fact that Scots law permits 16- and 17-year olds to get married is a separate is-
sue. In its most recent Concluding Observation, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
recommended that, ‘The State party raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 years across all 
devolved administrations’: crc/C/gbr/CO/5: 5, para. 19.
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blanket operation was intended to ensure the scheme operated without dis-
tinction: this was a valid aim in its own right, to treat all children alike and 
thereby reduce stigma. To this extent it was comparable to other schemes, such 
as the Health Visitor scheme, whereby every pre-school child has an allocated 
health visitor to help address any queries or concerns. Likewise, the Scottish 
“baby box” scheme offers every mother-to-be a box of essential supplies for her 
newborn child. Because it is offered to all mothers, there is no stigma attached 
to dressing your baby in the baby box clothes, for example, or using the other 
provisions.3
2.2 The Rationale
The rationale for the Named Person scheme was set out in the Government’s 
Policy Memorandum. There were at least three benefits sought to be achieved. 
First, the Named Person could act as an identified source of help when no oth-
er source is obvious: ‘Where children and young people face issues that are not 
easily addressed by the practitioners with whom they and their families are in 
regular contact, it is not always clear who they can turn to for help’ (Scottish 
Parliament Policy Memorandum, 2013: para. 66). By providing a Named Per-
son, every child and their family would have an identifiable point of contact 
and support. Second, a Named Person was intended to be able to identify the 
need for early intervention in the lives of children who need support, with the 
hope that the earlier the intervention, the better the outcome. This was one 
reason why the scheme was to apply to all children, and not just those identi-
fied as being at risk: by the time they have come to the attention of the local 
authority, the window for early intervention would typically have closed.
Thirdly, the scheme aimed to ensure that children did not “fall through the 
cracks” – typically where different agencies were involved, but there was no 
collaboration between them, to work together for the child. Thus, schools, the 
police, and the General Practitioner service might all be involved with the 
same child, but there will not always be an established pathway for communi-
cation, or any overarching strategy for the child. Having a Named Person as a 
single point of communication and support was designed to help close this 
gap, by ensuring improved communication and collaboration:
The Named Person will usually be a practitioner from a health board or 
an education authority, and someone whose job will mean they are al-
ready working with the child. They can monitor what children and young 
people need, within the context of their professional responsibilities, link 
3 Details of the scheme and the contents of the baby box are available at: https://www.mygov 
.scot/baby-box/.
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with the relevant services that can help them, and be a single point of 
contact for services that children and families can use, if they wish. The 
Named Person is in a position to intervene early to prevent difficulties 
escalating. The role offers a way for children and young people to make 
sense of a complicated service environment as well as a way to prevent 
any problems or challenges they are facing in their lives remaining unad-
dressed due to professional service boundaries. Their job is to understand 
what children and young people need and quickly make the connection 
to those services that can help when extra help is needed. (Scottish Par-
liament Policy Memorandum, 2013: para. 68)
Numerous reviews into the tragic deaths of children at the hands of their par-
ents or carers had identified both a failure to act timeously and a lack of com-
munication between agencies as key failings (Sutherland, 2017: 295–296). The 
evidence therefore pointed to the fact that, even where there was involvement 
in a child’s life by a range of services, this was not always sufficient to protect 
them (Sutherland, 2017: 303). The Named Person service was intended to tackle 
these failings and, in doing so, to promote a ‘change in the culture and practice 
of all services that affected the lives of children, young people and their fami-
lies’ (Petition of the Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of the Chil-
dren and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 30.)
Prior to the introduction of the 2014 Act, the scheme had already been tri-
alled in a number of areas within Scotland, such as the Highland Pathfinder 
Project, which had been positively received (Scottish Parliament Policy Memo-
randum, 2013: para. 86; Sutherland, 2017: 304). There had also been a consulta-
tion on the scheme, again with generally positive results – albeit with some 
concerns about the guidance to Named Persons on sharing information be-
tween different bodies:
The proposal to provide a Named Person for every child and young person 
was strongly supported by stakeholders, both through the public consulta-
tion and the engagement undertaken. However, concern was expressed 
about the existing legal framework for information sharing. This was 
felt to be confusing and potentially insufficient to enable the role of the 
Named Person to operate as well as anticipated. In particular, there 
were concerns regarding the sharing of information about children 
where consent is not given, both between others and the Named Per-
son, and the Named Person and other professionals. It was felt that this 
could lead to professionals being unsure as to when information should 
be shared (Scottish Parliament Policy Memorandum, 2013: 75, emphasis 
added).
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Despite these concerns regarding what was (at the time) viewed as a fairly 
technical issue, there certainly did not appear to be anything to prevent the 
2014 Act being implemented. There can be no doubt that the scheme it envis-
aged had a clear and worthy rationale on the face of it, and had been the sub-
ject of lengthy and detailed planning, consultation and testing. Why then was 
it abandoned without ever being applied?
3 Concerns with the Scheme: Controversy and Litigation
Concerns about the operation of the scheme were present from when the draft 
bill was first introduced. These typically reflected the competing concerns of 
parents, on the one hand, and those likely to be Named Persons on the other. 
From the service provider perspective, concerns included resourcing and 
training of the employees to be Named Persons and, critically, liability. The 
2014 Act made clear that ‘responsibility for the exercise of the Named Person 
functions lies with the service provider rather than the Named Person’ (2014 
Act, s. 19(8)) A further apprehension was whether an employee of the state can 
truly hold the state to account, in situations where a dispute arises between 
the child or family and the local authority. If, for example, the child’s complaint 
was with the school, and the Named Person was a teacher at the school, would 
that teacher be able to act as an independent advocate for the child and fami-
ly? And, perhaps most significantly given the existing failings in state support 
for children at risk, ‘disquiet was occasioned by the prospect of resources being 
diverted to monitor vast numbers of children who have no demonstrable need 
for state intervention, when over-stretched social work departments are un-
able to fulfil their responsibilities to children who are already on their radar 
due to concerns about their care’ (Sutherland, 2017: 305). In a particularly 
 distressing twist, one of the children killed by his parents in the year the 2014 
Act was introduced, Liam Fee, had been in a local authority area where a pre- 
cursor of the Named Person scheme was in place (Sutherland, 2017: 303–4). 
Would there have been sufficient resources allocated to the new scheme to 
implement it effectively? Absent such resources, the death of Liam Fee sug-
gested that failings would continue.
Opposition also came from parents and groups representing parents. De-
spite the clearly stated aim of the scheme, to support children and families and 
secure early intervention to maximise beneficial outcomes, there were strong 
critics from the outset. The focus of the concerns were on the unwanted – and 
allegedly unwarranted – state interference with family life that could result 
from the powers of the Named Person. A campaign group, No2NP, was formed 
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to contest the legislation, arguing that, ‘The Scottish Government’s planned 
Named Person scheme will undermine parents’ responsibility for their own 
children and allow state officials unprecedented powers to interfere with fam-
ily life.’4
A legal challenge was mounted, contesting the appointment of a Named 
Person to every child in Scotland: Petition of the Christian Institute and Others 
for Judicial Review of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 ([2015] 
csoh 7). There were seven petitioners, comprising both charities and individ-
uals: The Christian Institute; Family Education Trust (an English charity which 
researches the causes and consequences of family breakdown); The Young ME 
Sufferers (“tymes”) Trust; Care (Christian Action Research and Education); 
James and Rhianwen Mcintosh; and Deborah Thomas. They claimed that they 
were ‘acting in the public interest as responsible members of and participants 
in civil society… and concerned about what they perceive to be an excess or 
misuse of power reflected in the [Named Person] provisions…’ (Petition of the 
Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of the Children and Young Peo-
ple (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 7). Two of the petitioners were par-
ents who argued that, in accordance with their Christian beliefs, raising their 
family is a God-given responsibility placed upon them and not the State (Peti-
tion of the Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of the Children and 
Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 8).
The challenge was rejected at first instance in the Outer House of the Court 
of Session and again on appeal to the Inner House (The Christian Institute and 
Others v. The Scottish Ministers [2015] csih 64). The campaigners appealed to 
the UK Supreme Court (The Christian Institute and Others v. The Lord Advocate 
[2016] uksc 51). Despite the impetus being their objection to state interfer-
ence in family life, the petitioners’ legal claim focused on whether the scheme 
was beyond the competence of the Scottish Parliament. The petitioners al-
leged the 2014 Act was not lawful because it breached the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and European Union law, specifically regarding the data 
sharing provisions. Thus, the challenge was that the powers of the Named Per-
son to share personal data about children with a range of other agencies were 
not compliant with the (then) data protection regime and Article 8, echr 
 privacy rights.5 Despite the Scottish Government’s success at the first two 
4 https://no2np.org/ (accessed 19 June 2019).
5 A third strand of argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners was that the 2014 Act was 
outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, as a devolved legislature, as it 
legislated on a matter reserved to Westminster, being data protection. The uksc concluded 
that the purpose of the legislation, being to promote the wellbeing of children and young 
people, did not ‘relate to’ data protection: [2016] uksc 51: paras. 63–66.
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 hearings, the petitioners reversed their fortunes at the third attempt. The UK 
Supreme Court held that the scheme, as drafted, would not be compliant with 
data protection legislation:
In summary, we conclude that the information-sharing provisions of … 
the Act … are incompatible with the rights of children, young persons 
and parents under article 8 of the echr because they are not ‘in accor-
dance with the law’ as that article requires … [and] may in practice result 
in a disproportionate interference with the article 8 rights of many chil-
dren, young persons and their parents, through the sharing of private in-
formation (The Christian Institute and Others v. The Lord Advocate [2016] 
uksc 51: para. 106).
The Supreme Court therefore referred the data sharing proposals back to the 
Scottish Government, to review and revise the data sharing guidance.
Following the Scottish Government defeat in that case in 2016, the Named 
Person scheme was put on hold, pending revised data sharing provisions 
which would comply with Article 8, echr and the new gdpr regime for data 
protection. In an attempt to achieve this compliance, the Scottish Government 
introduced the Children and Young People (Information Sharing) (Scotland) 
Bill in September 2017.6 The Scottish Government also established a girfec 
Practice Development Panel in late 2017, with the objective of developing a 
data sharing Code of Practice. The Panel was due to report in September 2018, 
but its  final report was delayed. Eventually, in August 2019, minutes from the 
girfec Practice Development Panel meeting of 21 March 2019 were published 
(girfec Practice Development Panel, 2019). These indicated that the Panel 
would not be delivering a data sharing Code: ‘a statutory Code of Practice that 
must be applied in all situations is not the right thing to do at this time, which 
is brave’. Although such a Code could be produced, ‘it would not be desirable as 
the complexity of this would mean it would not be easy to understand or apply 
in practice’ (girfec Practice Development Panel, 2019). Just weeks after the 
publication of these Minutes, the Deputy First Minister announced:
6 The Scottish Parliament’s Education and Skills Committee heard evidence on the draft bill 
from a wide range of parties, including the Law Society of Scotland and the Faculty of Advo-
cates (20 September 2017); Dr Ken Macdonald, Head of ico Regions; and Maureen Falconer, 
Regional Manager, the Information Commissioner’s Office (4 September 2017). The written 
evidence of the Faculty of Advocates acknowledged that the issues raised by the uksc were 
not ‘easy to resolve’: http://www.advocates.org.uk/media/2498/final-faculty-response-15-aug-
2017-named-person.pdf.
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We will now not underpin in law the mandatory named person scheme 
for every child. We will withdraw the Children and Young People (Infor-
mation Sharing) (Scotland) Bill and repeal the relevant legislation. In-
stead, existing voluntary schemes that provide a point of contact for sup-
port will continue, under current law (Scottish Parliament Business, 
2019).
From a data protection perspective, the primary impediment to implementing 
the scheme was the need for a lawful basis for processing the personal data of 
children (and their parents). The comprehensive nature of the intended 
scheme, in applying to all children, meant that many lawful bases were unsuit-
able (General Data Protection Regulation 2018, articles 6, 7 and 9; Data Protec-
tion Act 2018, ss. 8, 10 and 11). Seeking consent from children or parents was 
simply not relevant for a scheme which was meant to apply on a blanket basis, 
rather than an opt-in one. Even if consent had been appropriate to provide a 
lawful basis, there would have been complexities in seeking consent from chil-
dren, and determining whether they have capacity. There is a presumption 
that children over 12 have capacity, but this can be rebutted (Data Protection 
Act 2018, s. 208). Other grounds for processing, such as the vital interests of the 
data subject, were also effectively excluded by the blanket application: it would 
not be in the vital interests of every child to have a Named Person appointed. 
Instead, “vital interests” would be likely to be limited to those identified as “at 
risk”. In the absence of some other broad “public interest” justification, secur-
ing a lawful basis for processing the relevant data of (almost) all children in 
Scotland, appears to have been an insurmountable hurdle.
However, the focus of this article is not on the challenges of ensuring a data 
protection compliant regime, nor on the litigation itself. Instead, this article 
aims to explore the Article 5, uncrc dimension to the proposed scheme. Two 
aspects of the judgments will therefore be considered: the views of the judi-
ciary on the impact of the Named Person scheme on family life; and the impli-
cations of Article 5 uncrc for the scheme.7
7 An examination of the proposals in the scheme against the uncrc as a whole, including key 
articles such as Articles 3 (best interests), 12 (views of the child) and 16 (privacy), is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
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4 The Named Person Scheme and Family Life: The Judicial 
Perspective
At every stage of the legal proceedings, the judiciary gave explicit recognition 
to the extensive work that had gone in to developing the scheme, and its posi-
tive aims. In the words of Lord Pentland:
the policy behind the named person service has been developed carefully 
over more than a decade. The process of policy development has been 
informed by a high level of input from experts in child welfare, educa-
tion, health and care. The basic aim of the policy and the legislation giv-
ing effect to it is that the wellbeing of children will be promoted and safe-
guarded by providing for every child and his or her family a suitably 
qualified professional who can, if necessary, act as a single point of con-
tact between the child and any public services from which the child could 
benefit. The named person will be in a position to identify any emerging 
challenges for the child at an early stage and to provide information 
about and coordinate access to any necessary services for the child. The 
named person service is based on the girfec philosophy [Getting It 
Right For Every Child]. As the policy documents explain, that approach 
is grounded in putting the best interests of every child at the heart of 
decision- making; it encourages professionals to work together; and it ad-
vocates preventative work and early intervention to support children, 
young persons and their families (Petition of the Christian Institute and 
Others for Judicial Review of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 
2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 39).
On appeal, the Inner House of the Court of Session rejected claims about ex-
cessive state interference with the role of parents:
The mere creation of a named person, available to assist a child or parent, 
no more confuses or diminishes the legal role, duties and responsibilities 
of parents in relation to their children than the provision of social ser-
vices or education generally. It has no effect whatsoever on the legal, 
moral or social relationships within the family. The assertion to the con-
trary, without any supporting basis, has the appearance of hyperbole … The 
legislation does not involve the state taking over any functions currently 
carried out by parents in relation to their children (The Christian Institute 
and Others v. The Scottish Ministers [2015] csih 64: para. 68, emphasis 
added.)
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The Supreme Court too was apparently supportive of the intentions of the 
Scheme:
The public interest in the flourishing of children is obvious. The aim of 
the Act, which is unquestionably legitimate and benign, is the promotion 
and safeguarding of the wellbeing of children and young persons … the 
policy of promoting better outcomes for individual children and families 
is not inconsistent with the primary responsibility of parents to promote 
the wellbeing of their children. Improving access to, and the coordina-
tion of, public services which can assist the promotion of a child’s wellbe-
ing are legitimate objectives which are sufficiently important to justify 
some limitation on the right to respect for private and family life (The 
Christian Institute and Others v. The Lord Advocate [2016] uksc 51: para. 
91, emphasis added).
The fact that the Supreme Court approved the aim of the Act, whilst holding 
that it did not comply with Article 8, echr and the data protection regime, led 
to the curious position whereby both sides claimed the Supreme Court deci-
sion  as a victory: the petitioners because the scheme was defeated on the 
data   sharing side; the Scottish Government because the defeat was only on 
the data sharing side, with the express recognition that it would be lawful, be-
nign and unexceptionable if the data sharing guidance was lawful (Sutherland, 
2017: 306).
However, in reaching their conclusion, the Supreme Court explicitly ac-
knowledged that the aim of improving public services to promote child well-
being can justify some limit on the right to respect for private and family life. Is 
this an implication that the Named Person scheme would indeed have im-
pinged on that right? And did it also engage Article 5, uncrc?
5 Is the Named Person Scheme Compliant with Article 5, uncrc?
5.1 Assessing Article 5 and the Named Person Scheme
Article 5 states:
Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, 
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community 
as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legal-
ly  responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with 
the  evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance 
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in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention.
To what extent did the proposed Named Person scheme respect the ‘responsi-
bilities, rights and duties of parents’ to provide ‘in a manner consistent with 
the evolving capacity of the child’ the appropriate ‘direction and guidance’ in 
the child’s exercise of his or her Convention rights?
In fact, rather unusually for domestic litigation in Scotland, the petitioners 
referred to Article 5, uncrc, briefly, in their pleadings. The judge, Lord Pent-
land, summarised their submissions on this point:
In support of their claims of infringement of [echr] Convention rights, 
the petitioners maintained that the enactment of the provisions in Part 4 
of the Act was also incompatible with the rights enjoyed by the fifth to sev-
enth petitioners under a number of international instruments, namely
1. article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948;
2.  article 23(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (reference was also made to article 17);
3.  article 10(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966;
4.  and articles 3(2) and 5 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1969. [sic]
Although differently expressed, all these measures aim to safeguard the 
family and the home against disproportionate interference by the State; 
they recognise the family as having the primary role in the upbringing and 
education of children.
One might also refer to article 24(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (‘the cfr’); this provides that children have the 
right to such protection and care as is necessary for their wellbeing (Peti-
tion of the Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of the Children 
and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 41, emphasis 
added).
It seems to have been accepted that all these international provisions were rel-
evant to the dispute and, as Lord Pentland said, ‘informed the proper interpre-
tation and application of the [echr] Convention rights of the fifth to seventh 
petitioners’ (Petition of the Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review 
of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 41). 
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But having sprinkled a medley of Declarations, Conventions, Covenants and 
Charters into their case, no specific line of argument was predicated on any 
of them:
The petitioners did not, however, advance any stand-alone line of argu-
ment based on the terms and effect of the international measures. Rath-
er, they submitted that they formed part of the backdrop against which 
their claims of infringement of [echr] Convention rights should be eval-
uated (Petition of the Christian Institute and Others for Judicial Review of 
the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 [2015] csoh 7: para. 41, 
emphasis added).
Thus, while accepting that Article 5, uncrc was relevant, the nature of its rel-
evance and its application to the issue at hand were not further explored. 
There was also no consideration of Article 5 in the context of the uncrc as a 
whole, nor the possible impact of other Convention articles, such as Article 3 
(best interests of the child) or Article 16 (privacy).
The Supreme Court also reflected on the role of the uncrc here:
As is well known, it is proper to look to international instruments, such 
as the uncrc, as aids to the interpretation of the echr. The Preamble 
to the uncrc states:
‘the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environ-
ment for the growth and wellbeing of all its members and particularly 
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so 
that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.’
Many articles in the uncrc acknowledge that it is the right and respon-
sibility of parents to bring up their children …; article 5 requires States 
Parties to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents … to 
provide appropriate direction and guidance to the child in the exercise of 
his or her rights under the Convention (The Christian Institute and Others 
v. The Lord Advocate [2016] uksc 51: para. 72).
Again, no specific challenge to the Named Person scheme was advanced on the 
back of Article 5, uncrc. However, the Supreme Court did explore the need 
for Article 5, uncrc and the imperative for the state to allow families freedom 
in how they function. The Court recognised that: ‘There is an inextricable link 
between the protection of the family and the protection of fundamental free-
doms in liberal democracies’ (The Christian Institute and Others v. The Lord Ad-
vocate [2016] uksc 51: para. 73.) Article 5, uncrc plays a fundamental role in 
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ensuring the state cannot interfere without good cause in the life of the family, 
as a guard against oppression:
Different upbringings produce different people. The first thing that a to-
talitarian regime tries to do is to get at the children, to distance them 
from the subversive, varied influences of their families, and indoctrinate 
them in their rulers’ view of the world. Within limits, families must be left 
to bring up their children in their own way (The Christian Institute and 
Others v. The Lord Advocate [2016] uksc 51: para 73; In Re B (Children) 
[2008] ukhl 35: para. 20).
But there is another side to this coin. The very real concerns expressed by the 
Supreme Court have to be balanced against the potential harm to children 
which can occur behind closed doors: parents cannot plead privacy to inflict 
cruelty or neglect with impunity. As the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
observed in a report from a 1994 Discussion Day:
Children are often abused, neglected, and their right to physical integrity 
ignored, on the assumption that the privacy of the family automatically 
confers on parents the ability to make correct and informed judgments 
with respect to ‘the responsible upbringing of future citizens’ (General 
Day of Discussion Report, 1994: 194–195).
To what extent would the Named Person scheme have succeeded in balancing 
these conflicting risks: over-interference in private life vs the risk of abuse in 
private? Had it been implemented, would it have interfered with the ‘responsi-
bilities, rights and duties’ of parents? It is also important to remember that the 
Article 5 rights of parents are given in the context of the child exercising Con-
vention rights. It specifies that these responsibilities, rights and duties are giv-
en to parents to enable them ‘to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolv-
ing capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance’ to the child 
(Sutherland, 2020: tbc). Thus, both elements must be considered: the rights of 
parents, and the evolving capacity of the child.
5.2 The Responsibilities and Rights of Parents
Opposition to the scheme was frequently framed in terms of interference with 
the “rights of parents”. However, it is arguable that these objections stemmed 
from a misconceived understanding of parental responsibilities and rights, 
both under the uncrc and domestic legislation, whereby parents at times fo-
cus on the notion of their “rights” without understanding the substance of 
those rights, or the relationship to their parallel responsibilities. Parental rights 
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in Scotland – as in many jurisdictions – are there to enable parents to fulfil 
their parental responsibilities. Section 1 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
sets out the parental responsibilities, and section 2 the corresponding paren-
tal rights, shaped to ensure they can meet these responsibilities. (Even the or-
dering of these sections underlines the importance of responsibilities, given 
that they are set out first, in section 1, with the rights flowing therefrom in 
 section 2.)
The responsibilities imposed on parents include the duties to ‘safeguard 
and promote the child’s health, development and welfare’ (Children (Scot-
land) Act 1995, s. 1(1)(a)) and to ‘to provide, in a manner appropriate to the 
stage of development of the child (i) direction; (ii) guidance to the child’ (Chil-
dren (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 1(1)(b)). The appointment of a Named Person, who 
would also be able to provide advice and support, would not automatically 
interfere with the responsibility of the parents to do so. Moreover, the refer-
ence here to the ‘stage of development’ reflects the evolving capacity of the 
child, which is also an important part of Article 5, uncrc. The parental rights 
are specifically given to parents to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities 
(Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 2): they go no further than that. And one of 
the rights is the right ‘to control, direct or guide, in a manner appropriate to the 
stage of development of the child, the child’s upbringing’ (Children (Scotland) 
Act 1995, s. 2(1)(b)). Again, this requires parents to take account of the evolving 
capacity of their child.
5.3 Evolving Capacity of the Child
It is arguable that the Named Person scheme sought to reflect and respect the 
evolving capacity of the child – a core element of Article 5. By providing a 
source of support and advice to the child, the scheme would have allowed chil-
dren to decide as and when they were ready to seek help themselves, without 
having to rely on (or be constrained by) their parents. It therefore attempted to 
encourage children to take responsibility for raising any issues with the Named 
Person, and presumably as children develop, and their capacity evolves, they 
would be able to seek assistance that reflects their own needs and abilities.
When the significance of evolving capacity is recognised, the true impact of 
Article 5 becomes clear. No parent has an absolute and unfettered right to raise 
their child: parenting must be seen in the framework of parental responsibili-
ties and rights, and against the background of the child’s evolving capacity. The 
Named Person would have been there to support the child through providing 
guidance and support, and also help support the parents in fulfilling their re-
sponsibilities and rights. To this extent, the proposals in the Named Person 
scheme could certainly be viewed as in keeping with parental responsibilities 
and rights and Article 5, rather than in conflict.
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6 Concluding Comments
As this article has shown, the Named Person scheme had the potential to 
support both parents and children in the context of Article 5. However, the 
concern remains that the scheme would nevertheless have encroached on 
 Article 5 because of its blanket application. While this had a clear rationale 
in facilitating early intervention – and in avoiding stigma – it is at the heart of 
all the problems that were faced by the initiative. By imposing the scheme 
on all children, it became arguable that the state was no longer respecting their 
evolving capacity, through denying them the right to choose to opt in. Pub-
lic opposition to the scheme also centred round this wholesale application. 
Moreover, this was the key factor causing problems for the Scottish Govern-
ment in finding a lawful basis for processing and sharing personal data – a 
critical element of the Named Person proposals. While the emphasis of this 
article has been on Article 5, the ultimate stumbling block for the Scottish Gov-
ernment was the data sharing element. Nevertheless, with the scheme now 
abandoned, there is a real risk that children are denied the support they need, 
which will also fail to respect their evolving capacity in choosing to seek guid-
ance from others as well as parents. The Scottish Government must therefore 
seek another way to protect children, through enhanced early intervention 
and  guidance – while also respecting the responsibilities of parents and, criti-
cally, the evolving capacity of the child. Further developments in this fraught 
field are awaited with interest.
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